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7.1 Introduction
The 1980s witnessed the emergence of large and persistent current account
imbalances among the major industrial countries in the international economic
system. The United States is presently running a current account deficit of
some 2
1/2 percent of its gross national product (GNP), while Japan and Ger-
many have current surpluses of similar order relative to their output levels.
The persistence of these payments imbalances has given rise to unprecedented
changes in the stocks of net foreign assets and liabilities of these countries.
This process has transformed the United States from the largest net creditor
country during most of the postwar period to the world's largest net debtor,
with net foreign liabilities estimated officially at $630 billion in 1989.' These
developments have naturally raised fundamental questions about the magni-
tude and sustainability of the U.S. external position.
External sustainability of a debtor country is usually defined as a nonexplo-
sive path of net foreign debt relative to some scale variable, that attempts to
measure the ability of the country to generate payments to nonresident credi-
tors. In the case of the United States, sustainability could be defined as a
stable—or as a path leading to the attainment of a stable—net foreign asset to
GNP ratio.
2 Consider now what the path of this ratio may look like with un-
changed policies.
3 By the balance of payments identity, the net stock of for-
eign assets, Ft, can be expressed as
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(1) F, = Bt + (1 + i)'F,_lt
where Bt represents the trade balance and / the nominal interest rate. Dividing
through by nominal GNP, and using lower-case letters to denote ratios to nom-
inal GNP, we have that
rt\ r U , ^




where r represents the real interest rate, in terms of domestic goods, and g the
growth rate of real GNP. In 1989 the stock of net foreign assets is estimated to
have been — 12.0 percent of GNP and the trade balance — 2.4 percent of GNP.
Assuming a constant real interest rate, r, of 3.6 percentage points and a growth
rate of real output, g, of 2.8 percent, it follows from (3) that for r > g, given
that the/-ratio in 1989 was negative, the real interest burden per unit of output
is positive. With a positive real interest burden, a necessary condition for the
ratio to trough or stabilize over time is that the trade balance fall as a percent-
age of GNP and eventually go into surplus.
There is a whole set of exchange rate paths, policy changes, and behavioral
responses that would lead to a stable /-ratio by pushing the balance of trade
sufficiently into surplus to service the debt. One way of tackling the issue is to
examine how much exchange rate depreciation is required for the ratio to sta-
bilize. Figure 7.1 presents some illustrative paths for the/-ratio for alternative
rates of depreciation of the dollar. The exchange rate paths represent nominal
rates of depreciation of the dollar of 1, 2, and 3 percent a year against all
currencies. The IMF's MULTIMOD model, which is described in the next sec-
tion, was used to compute the improvements in the trade balance to GNP
ratio, b, in response to an exogenous decline in the exchange rate. Nominal
rather than real exchange rate paths were assumed so as to enable the model
to endogenously determine the path of the real exchange rate and allow for
other feedback effects. It should be noted that in all cases the extent of the real
depreciation is substantially smaller, varying from 50 to 70 percent of the
nominal depreciation.
Figure 7.1 shows that both the time required for the/-ratio to trough and
the level at which it troughs can vary substantially. For a 1 percent rate of
nominal depreciation, the ratio troughs at approximately —40 percent, albeit
after a substantial period of time, by the year 2017. On the other hand, at a
nominal rate of depreciation of 3 percent a year the ratio troughs at - 20
percent by 1997. Note that for simplicity and purposes of comparison, the rate
of depreciation has been kept constant up to the horizon presented. Therefore,
the/-ratio continues to rise once it has troughed. There is of course no reason233 Sustainability, Premia, and the Dollar
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Fig. 7.1 U.S. net foreign assets under alternative exchange rate assumptions
why the exchange rate should continue to depreciate once the balance of trade
is sufficiently in surplus to service the debt. If this were the case, the/-ratio
would then likely stabilize.
The above discussion of sustainability, while showing that the/-ratio for the
United States can easily trough or stabilize for reasonably small rates of depre-
ciation of the dollar, ignores the issue of whether the ratio, even if it were to
stabilize, would be consistent with the asset preferences of non-U.S. resi-
dents—the ultimate holders of the debt. The counterpart of the current and
expected future decline in the U.S. /-ratio has been an increase in the share of
holdings of net dollar assets in foreign portfolios. Recently, Dealtry and Van't
dack (1989) have examined the impact of changes in the U.S. net external
position on foreign portfolios. Their study suggests that the increase in the
share of dollar assets in these portfolios has not been substantial. For ex-
ample, they estimate that gross financial claims on the United States held by
private residents of foreign industrial countries increased from 1.8 to 2.8 per-
cent of total business-sector financial assets in these countries from 1981 to
1988, leaving a considerable potential for further increases. Moreover, they
project that if the U.S. current account deficit were to persist at its 1988 level
of $125 billion, with no change in the pattern of net capital inflows, this share
would still be less than 4.5 percent by 1993. Figure 7.2 plots the counterpart
of figure 7.1, expressing the ratio of net U.S. foreign assets as a percentage of234 Bankim Chadha and Steven Symansky
Ratio of U.S. Net Foreign assets to World Financial Portfolio (%)
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Fig. 7.2 U.S. net external liabilities in world financial portfolio
foreign industrial country financial portfolios, assuming for simplicity a con-
stant financial portfolio to income ratio of three.
4
The above suggests that (i) the U.S. net foreign asset to GNP ratio can
stabilize or trough for reasonably small rates of depreciation of the dollar; and
(ii) the associated increase in net U.S. liabilities as a proportion of foreign
financial portfolios has been unprecedented but small, and is unlikely to in-
crease substantially as a percentage of these portfolios if the U.S. /-ratio
troughs or stabilizes. The final verdict on the sustainability of the U.S. exter-
nal position, however, rests critically on the willingness of foreign investors
to allow such an increase, however small, in their portfolios. A primary rea-
son why foreign investors may become increasingly unwilling to hold addi-
tional quantities of U.S. debt is, as Dooley and Isard (1986) argue, the possi-
bility of default. Krugman (1988, 1989a) and others have pointed out that for
the United States, given its size and relatively limited dependence on foreign
trade, the incentives to default may be greater than for other countries. This
default does not have to take the form of an explicit refusal to repay. It could
take the form of a differential tax levied by residence status, as in Dooley and
Isard (1986)—for example, a tax on repatriated interest—or it could take the
form of an inflation, or any other measure attempting to reduce the real value
of the external debt to domestic residents. Moreover, there exists the possibil-
ity that foreign investors may decide to reduce the amount of U.S. debt they
are willing to hold. This might happen for reasons that are either exogenous
to the United States, for example, an increase in the attractiveness of investing235 Sustainability, Premia, and the Dollar
elsewhere; or it could result from a perception that the path of the U.S./-ratio
was either unsustainable or going to become so, for example, because of an
expected increase in the fiscal deficit. The situation is not unlike that for the
Latin American debtors. Diaz-Alejandro (1984) attributes the build-up of
Latin American debt during the 1970s to a one-time stock adjustment in inter-
national investors' portfolios, after which net inflows ceased abruptly, precip-
itating the "debt crisis" and consequent financial squeeze and depression of
the 1980s in these economies. Therefore, a primary concern for the United
States, resulting from the accumulation of foreign debt, is the exposure and
vulnerability of the United States to a portfolio shift.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of a portfolio shift
against the dollar in a well-specified macroeconometric model for the indus-
trial countries and the rest of the world. Section 7.2 briefly describes the
model used. Section 7.3 then examines the effects of an exogenous shift in
portfolio preferences against the dollar. Section 7.4 endogenizes the premium
required to hold assets denominated in different currencies in world portfolios
by making it a function of expected deviations of countries'/-ratios from ar-
bitrarily specified levels. We examine what the path of the dollar might look
like in such a scenario where, for example, there is a "run" on the dollar
triggered by expectations that the U.S. external position will deteriorate. A
conclusion that emerges from this section is that for reasonable declines in the
U.S. /-ratio, such runs on the dollar would be stabilizing in that international
investors could successfully impose on the U.S. an arbitrary/-ratio; and if it
were to deviate, such a market reaction would bring it back. The economic
consequences of such an imposed external adjustment are discussed. It is
shown that small premiums can produce substantial movements of exchange
rates and, over time, in/-ratios. Section 7.5 concludes the paper.
7.2 Overview of MULTIMOD
The simulations below use MULTIMOD, a multi-region econometric model
developed by the IMF staff. While a more complete description of the model
is available elsewhere,
5 a brief description is presented here in order to help
the reader understand the simulations.
MULTIMOD is a system of linked models designed to analyze the interactions
of economic policies and developments among the industrial countries, as
well as to examine how changes in economic conditions in the industrial
world affect developing countries as a group. It is a dynamic Mundell-Fleming
model that incorporates rational expectations in both goods and financial mar-
kets. However, policy can be effective in altering output because not all mar-
kets clear contemporaneously. In the goods market, for example, it is assumed
that there are overlapping contracts and prices are sticky.
The system presently contains econometric models (estimated on the basis
of annual data) for each of the G-7 countries (the United States, Canada, Ja-236 Bankim Chadha and Steven Symansky
pan, Germany, France, Italy, and the United Kingdom), the smaller industrial
countries as a group, high-income (capital-exporting) developing countries as
a group, and other (capital-importing) developing countries as a group. Be-
cause of the limited degrees of freedom resulting from annual data, most of
the equations were estimated using pooled cross-section time-series methods,
and coefficients are often the same across countries unless rejected by the data.
The main linkages among the regions are the endogenous determination of
prices and volumes of trade in goods and of exchange rates and interest rates.
Each of the countries and regions produces manufactured goods which are
imperfect substitutes. Imports of manufactured goods by the industrial coun-
tries (and capital-exporting developing countries) are functions of relative
prices and absorption. Imports by the capital-importing countries depend
upon the amount of available foreign exchange (which depends, in turn, on
exports and on the region's current and expected ability to service its debt).
Each country's (or region's) imports of manufactured goods are allocated as
exports across the other countries and regions through a trade matrix, with the
initial pattern based on historical trading patterns. Trade shares adjust in re-
sponse to changes in relative prices. It is assumed that all countries demand
oil and that oil is homogeneous, with the developing countries as a group the
residual suppliers. Non-oil primary commodities are produced by the devel-
oping countries, and the price of this aggregate good adjusts in the short run
to clear the market, with production and supply eventually responding to
changes in relative prices.
Domestic demand is composed of exogenous government spending on
goods and services, as well as behaviorally determined private consumption
and investment. Private consumption is derived from intertemporal utility
maximization and is determined, in equilibrium, by total wealth (discounted
future income plus financial assets); in the short run, it is affected by changes
in disposable income. Investment is modeled as a gradual adjustment to an
optimal level for the capital stock determined by the production technology.
The equation is estimated in error-correction form, with the error-correction
term specified as a forward-weighted average of output to capital and a sepa-
rate term for the user cost of capital
The prices of domestically produced goods are determined in a price-
markup Phillips curve relationship that incorporates overlapping wage con-
tracts, so that prices are sticky. Current wage contracts are forward looking,
incorporating anticipated future rates of inflation. Export prices are assumed
to move with the domestic output price in the long run, but respond in the
short run to price movements in export markets. Import prices are a weighted
average of the export prices of other countries.
MULTIMOD models the demand for base money, rather than for a broader
aggregate. An interest-rate reaction function is used to determine the stance
of monetary policy in a country. For example, a fixed exchange rate system is237 Sustainability, Premia, and the Dollar
imposed for those countries of the European Monetary System (EMS) who
participate in the exchange rate mechanism (ERM). Italy, France, and the
smaller industrial countries as a group are assumed to peg their currencies to
the German deutsche mark by altering their interest rates in the short run (and,
of course, money supplies).
6 This policy regime results in a loss of monetary
policy autonomy by all the ERM countries except Germany. In each of the
other industrial countries, the monetary authorities set a target path for
the monetary base. The actual path of the money supply is determined by the
interest-rate reaction function which smoothes interest-rate changes in the
short run. The specification of the interest-rate reaction function is used to
avoid oscillations and large temporary changes in nominal interest rates (in-
strument instability), which result if the model is forced to track exactly a
target path of the monetary base. In the long run, however, the actual money
supply converges to the target path. With respect to monetary shocks,
MULTIMOD has the important property that in the long run it is homogeneous
of degree one in all nominal variables and degree zero in real variables.
Financial assets of the industrial countries are assumed to be perfect substi-
tutes, and nominal exchange rates are determined by open interest parity.
Long-term interest rates are specified as a weighted average of current and
expected future short-term rates. An important feature of the model is that
expectations about interest rates and exchange rates, as well as prices, are
forward looking and consistent with the model's solution in future periods
(i.e., expectations are "rational"). Thus current or expected future shocks to
the model can result in rather substantial "jumps" in interest rates and ex-
change rates. These interest rate changes affect investment and consumption
demand as well as the return on domestic and international debt stocks. The
exchange rate primarily affects exports and imports through a change in rela-
tive prices.
A word of caution is necessary regarding the simulations in this paper. All
the results are reported as a percentage or level deviation from a baseline
value. The baseline for MULTIMOD assumes that over the long run, the non-
interest government deficit and the trade balance tend toward balance, real
variables grow at the real rate of interest, prices grow at the same rate as
money, and thus all stock variables as a ratio to GNP stabilize.
7 These assump-
tions were made to allow the model to simulate around a reasonable steady
state. In general the model is relatively log linear and the choice of a baseline
is not crucial. However, for the scenarios discussed in this paper, the baseline
does affect the results because of the importance of baseline debt stocks in
determining the change in the current account resulting from a change in in-
terest rates. Since the U.S. net foreign asset position in the baseline is nega-
tive, the fiscal expansion described in section 7.4 results in a larger deteriora-
tion in the U.S. current account balance than if the baseline net foreign asset
position were positive. This implies that the exchange rate change necessary238 Bankim Chadha and Steven Symansky
to attain any particular improvement in the external position will be larger.
While the baseline assumptions affect the magnitude of the results, they do
not alter the basic issues described in this paper.
7.3 Exogenous Depreciation of the Dollar
In this section we consider the effects of an exogenous dollar depreciation
in order to highlight some of the properties of MULTIMOD.
8 In the IMF's World
Economic Outlook in October 1988 and the OECD's Economic Outlook in
June 1988, the effects on the world economy of a dollar depreciation, referred
to as the "financial tensions" and "market enforced adjustment" scenarios,
respectively, were discussed. In both cases, the analysis was motivated by the
belief that the dollar was overvalued at the time, in light of current account
imbalances that existed and the expectation that these imbalances would per-
sist over the medium term. In the scenarios referred to above, the exchange
rate is the outcome of an increase in the risk premium against dollar assets.
9
In the next section we postulate behavior that can endogenously produce a
dollar depreciation, but in the discussion below we restrict the simulation to
an exogenous decline in the nominal value of the dollar, with a compensating
movement in the risk premium.
In this simulation, we assume that the U.S. dollar depreciates by 10 percent
in nominal terms against all the currencies of the industrial countries. Table
7.1 presents the results as deviations from a baseline for the United States, an
aggregate of the other industrial countries, and the developing countries.
1
0
Note that the real exchange rate depreciates by less than 10 percent as domes-
tic prices adjust and offset some of the change in the nominal exchange rate,
with the absorption deflator increasing by 3 percent above the baseline for the
United States after a few years. On average, the real exchange rate depreciates
by 7 percent. The trade balance worsens on impact because of a J-curve effect
that lasts one year, but improves in both real and nominal terms over the me-
dium and long run. The trade balance is, on average, about 1 percent of GNP
above its baseline value, causing net foreign assets, as a percentage of GNP,
to rise continuously over time.
The depreciation of the dollar requires an increase in the spread between
U.S. and foreign interest rates. This increase in both real and nominal interest
rates causes domestic demand to decline, both in the short run and over the
medium term. Private consumption declines as a result of the increase in in-
terest rates which reduces wealth (this decline in wealth more than offsets the
increase in wealth arising from the increase in net foreign assets). The rise in
the user cost of capital produces a permanent decrease in investment expend-
itures, and both the capital stock and capacity output decline over the long
run. Although U.S. output rises in the short run because of an increase in net
exports, it falls below the baseline after three years owing to the sustainedO O — Os Os CO so Os
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decline in domestic demand. Thus the exogenous nominal depreciation pro-
duces a permanent rise in the real interest rate and results in a permanent loss
of output. In addition, it is worth noting that the dollar depreciation increases
the domestic debt burden of the government. First, the increase in interest
rates increases the servicing of the existing stock. Second, real output de-
clines, reducing the tax base. Lastly, nominal government spending and taxes
both rise with inflation, but since the government balance is initially in deficit,
the rise in domestic prices worsens the deficit.
In general the effect on the aggregate of the other industrial countries is the
mirror image of the United States, although the deviations are more modest.
The exchange rate change for each of these countries is smaller than for the
United States in effective terms, since each country is depreciating against the
dollar but remaining unchanged against the other currencies. The developing
countries are detrimentally affected by the dollar depreciation as exports from
this region decline. Combined with the rise in U.S. interest rates, foreign fi-
nancing, and therefore imports, decline. Since imports are the primary source
of capital formation, output declines over the medium term.
7.4 Endogenous Premia and External Sustainability
In this section we examine, through simulations of MULTIMOD, the possible
effects of international investors demanding a premium on holding dollar as-
sets if the U.S. net foreign asset to GNP ratio is expected to deviate from some
arbitrarily specified exogenous level, assumed to be perceived by investors to
be "sustainable."
1
1 In the baseline scenario for MULTIMOD, discussed in sec-
tion 7.2, the ratios of government debt and net foreign assets to GNP stabilize
over the long run. These assumptions were made to allow the model to simu-
late around a reasonable steady state. The first simulation presented below,
and shown in table 7.2, assumes that the decline in fiscal expenditures in-
cluded in the arbitrary baseline does not materialize. Rather, fiscal expendi-
tures are substantially above the baseline values. Since the paths for the fiscal
variables in the baseline rest on a policy stance similar to Gramm-Rudmann,
it is quite plausible to assume that these goals would not be achieved unless
Congress and the White House significantly change their behavior. It appears
that the anticipated peace dividends resulting from the easing of tensions in
Eastern Europe will likely be spent on increased aid to this region or domestic
programs. More precisely, we permanently increase fiscal expenditures by 5
percent of GNP above our baseline, phased in gradually over three years.
1
2
The fiscal expansion results in a relatively small and temporary increase in
U.S. output, with a substantial increase in the long-term nominal and real
interest rates, although short-term rates actually fall on impact.
1
3 With a pro-
longed increase in the real interest rate, domestic investment is persistently
crowded out and the stock of capital falls over the long run, resulting in a
permanent decline in capacity and hence output. The increase in domestic245 Sustainability, Premia, and the Dollar
absorption and the appreciation of the real exchange rate produce a substantial
increase in the trade deficit. The increase in U.S. nominal interest rates ampli-
fies the deficit on the current account, and the net foreign asset position con-
tinues to deteriorate.
1
4 In fact, it appears that it is on an unstable path. The
increase in government spending substantially raises the ratio of domestic
government debt to GNP, results in a permanent increase in interest rates and
a permanent appreciation of the nominal and the real exchange rate.
The U.S. fiscal expansion increases the output of foreign industrial coun-
tries, at least in the short run, primarily through the increase in foreign net
exports. However, the appreciation of the dollar puts upward pressure on for-
eign domestic prices, creating a decline in the real money supply and an in-
crease in interest rates. Therefore, output declines over the medium term be-
cause of a fall in both domestic consumption and real investment. The
counterpart to the decline in the U.S. net foreign asset position is of course a
rise in the net foreign asset position of the other industrial countries. The
developing countries are not adversely affected by the U.S. fiscal expansion.
Although net lending to the debtor countries falls as the increase in U.S. inter-
est rates reduces the ability of these countries to service the debt, the U.S.-
induced increase in export revenues more than compensates and the develop-
ing countries are able to increase their imports.
As argued earlier, it seems unreasonable to believe that the industrial coun-
tries will continue to build up claims on the United States without some com-
pensating increase in the rate of return on U.S. assets, MULTIMOD assumes
that assets denominated in different currencies are perfect substitutes. There-
fore, the primary channel remaining to return net asset stocks to their steady-
state values is changes in consumption due to wealth transfers. Although these
net foreign assets are part of total wealth and their change is rather substantial
in the U.S. fiscal expansion, this component of financial wealth represents a
relatively small fraction of total wealth. If the model were run for more than
fifty years, eventually the change in the net foreign asset positions would
dominate total wealth and domestic consumption would respond.
1
5 But the
assumption of perfect asset substitutability becomes less tenable as the size of
interest payments made to foreign residents grows substantially, increasing the
incentive for either an explicit or implicit default. This could take the form of
new tax laws on income to foreigners or possibly some form of capital con-
trols.
1
6 Krugman (1988), for example, suggests that the United States, prob-
ably more than any other country, has the least incentive to abide by the rules
of the game. Thus, it is likely that a premium of some form will become
necessary for foreign investors to hold U.S. assets if the foreign asset to GNP
ratio is expected to continuously worsen, as in this fiscal scenario. Branson
and Marchese (1988) posit the existence of such a premium on portfolio-
balance grounds.
The approach used here is to assume that there is an arbitrary long-run level
of the net foreign assets to GNP ratio, /, that foreign investors perceive asI I I I I I
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"sustainable." Investors will demand a premium if it appears that, ex ante, the
ratio would deviate from this level because of policy changes or exogenous
shocks. We assume that the premium is constant over time and, if the system
is stable, the magnitude is enough to force the net foreign asset to GNP ratio
back to this prespecified level over a specific time period (twenty years, in this
paper). The rule used here is somewhat arbitrary, and it is easy to imagine
alternative functional forms. Nevertheless, it provides a useful, model-based
way to capture "rational runs" on a currency. Some alternative functional
forms are discussed below.
The mechanics of the rule are as follows. We first define a currency pre-
mium, r\, and a predetermined target value of the foreign asset to GNP ratio,
/ The value of t] is determined such that/7 converged to/ when -n is added to
the interest-arbitrage condition
(4) (1 + /) = (1 + i*)-(e,+ l/e,) + -n,
where i* and e are defined, respectively, as multilaterally weighted foreign
nominal interest rates and the exchange rate (defined as the number of units of
the domestic currency for a unit of the foreign currency).
1
7 In order to solve
for the equilibrium value of r\ that is consistent with the underlying model and
satisfies the above / convergence condition, we used the following iterative
process. There are eight industrial countries or regions in the model. There-
fore we included premia for N — 1, or 7 countries; the United States was the
excluded country. The first step in the procedure is to run a number of simu-
lations on the model. For a specific currency, j, we shock r\ by adding an
arbitrary value to i) in equation (4) for the jth currency. We then calculate a
vector composed of AfT I At];, for / = 1 to 7. We then calculate the other six
j vectors by shocking i) for the other currencies. We refer to the full 7x7
derivative matrix as Z. The matrix Z is the matrix of (numerical) derivatives
of changes in net foreign asset to GNP ratios with respect to changes in the
premia.




kT is the vector of values of the net foreign asset ratio from any simu-
lation of the model in which T] is initially set to zero. Solving (5) for r\, we get
(6) Tl*
+
I = T|* + Z-' • tf-/r]-
We then add these new values of T| to the model, re-solve the model, and
recalculate (6) until -n converges.
Table 7.3 shows the deviations from the baseline scenario of the combined
effects of the premia behavior described above and the fiscal shock. The
weighted premium against the dollar turned out to be 1.08 percentage points.251 Sustainability, Premia, and the Dollar
Compared to table 7.2, we find that there has been a substantial reduction in
the net foreign asset position of the United States. Although equation (6) im-
plies that there should not be any deviation in the net foreign asset position for
any country, the results show modest deviations: for the United States, the
deviation is reduced from —36.6 to — 4.4 percent by the year 2010; the ag-
gregate of the other industrial countries shows a deviation from the baseline
of 1 percent in 2010 compared to 14 percent in the pure fiscal shock. This is
because MULTIMOD includes two developing country regions that are not rep-
resented in (6), and thus their net foreign asset positions were allowed to de-
viate from/. Since world net foreign assets sum to zero in the model and all
industrial countries except the United States reduce the deviations of their /-
ratios to approximately zero, as implied by equation (6), the negative of the
developing country deviation shows up in the U.S. position.
The U.S. dollar, which appreciated in the pure fiscal scenario, now depre-
ciates by 14 percent, although the year-on-year premium is small—little over
one percentage point. These results present a "hard landing" for the dollar.
While the nominal exchange rate depreciates on impact and hovers perma-
nently in this new range, the real exchange rate depreciates on impact and
then appreciates, regaining its baseline level almost exactly by 2010. Short
and long, real and nominal interest rates rise by considerably more than in the
previous scenario. Moreover, note that the difference in the increase in interest
rates between the two scenarios increases over time; that is to say, the effect
on interest rates of an increase in the premium against the dollar increases over
time. Thus, the financial squeeze resulting from the portfolio shift away from
dollar assets increases over time.
This "hard landing" imposes considerable long-run costs on the United
States. While output in the United States shows a rather substantial increase
on impact, even larger than in the pure fiscal expansion because of an expan-
sion of exports accompanying the exchange rate depreciation, the gain is short
lived. After five years, output is below its baseline level and the growth rate is
down by two percentage points. Moreover, the long-run decline in capacity,
and hence output, is larger. While the dollar depreciation does help the foreign
sector, the higher real interest rates seriously discourage domestic consump-
tion and investment. The higher U.S. interest rates also directly increase the
domestic and foreign debt-service burdens. There is a worsening of the gen-
eral government financial balance as a result of increased debt service, an
increase in the nominal value of fixed government expenditure in real terms,
and a decline in tax revenues as the tax base declines. The brunt of the adjust-
ment required is therefore borne by domestic consumption and investment.
For the other industrial countries, the dollar depreciation causes some
short-run costs in the form of a decline in output through net exports, but
encourages modest long-term growth through the decline in interest rates. In
the pure fiscal scenario, these countries experienced higher interest rates and
a long-term loss of output. For the developing countries, this outcome isI i i i I I I I — I CO I
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worse than the pure fiscal expansion, primarily because of the increased bur-
den of higher U.S. interest rates.
It is interesting to note that a relatively small premium of little over one
percentage point a year can bring about sizable movements in exchange
rates—a 14 percent nominal and a 10 percent real depreciation on impact—
and over time can cause a substantial movement in the/-ratio—more than 32
percentage points in twenty years. This accords well with the observation that
though large changes in exchange rates have been observed in the 1980s, ob-
served ex post risk premia have been small.
The functional form employed above describing the dependence of the pre-
mium on expected future / positions is, as stated earlier, arbitrary. Branson
and Marchese (1988) instead, posit time-varying premia as functions of the
contemporaneous level of/. We do not implement such a functional form,
primarily because of the potential existence of perverse short-run effects due
to the presence of J-curve effects on trade balances, and valuation effects on




The sustainability of the U.S. external position hinges on the willingness of
international investors to add, on net, U.S. liabilities to their portfolios. We
have argued that investors are unlikely to allow a "large" build-up of such
claims, and an important question is therefore the likely consequences of an
unwillingness on their part to add such claims to their portfolios. We have
modeled the effects of foreign investors imposing a "sustainable" foreign asset
ratio on the United States by positing the existence of a premium on dollar
assets when the foreign asset position is expected to deviate from this level.
The process presents an example of a self-correcting mechanism for attaining
external balance. The results show that the premia required may be modest for
"correcting" potentially large movements in net foreign asset positions. How-
ever, the costs of such an imposed adjustment can be substantial in terms of
lost output. Moreover, the results suggest that in the absence of a fiscal correc-
tion, this imposed external adjustment is likely to worsen the fiscal situation,
thus increasing the costs of adjustment in terms of private consumption, in-
vestment, and hence future output.
Notes
1. Various observers have argued that official U.S. statistics overstate the U.S. net
foreign liability position. See Ulan and Dewald (1989) and Danker and Hooper (1990).
It seems indisputable, however, that there has been a substantial decline in the position.
2. For a general discussion of movements in such ratios, see Dooley et al. (1986).
3. And what the path of the ratio may look like with unchanged behavioral re-
sponses. Krugman (1985, 1988) conducts a similar analysis.257 Sustainability, Premia, and the Dollar
4. The ratio was computed as/? = - /, • (GNP, / GNP,* x 3), where the asterisk
denotes the rest of the industrial countries. For assumptions on the path of foreign
variables, see the IMF's World Economic Outlook (October 1989).
5. The version of the model we used is based primarily upon Masson, Symansky,
and Meredith (1990). However, some of the changes in the model that are described in
that paper are very recent and are not incorporated in our version of MULTIMOD. See
also Masson et al. (1988) for a description of the first version of MULTIMOD.
6. The form of the interest-rate reaction function does allow for modest deviations
of the exchange rate from its target.
7. These are not official IMF assumptions.
8. A simulation is a useful way to understand some of a model's properties. In this
section we limit ourselves to an exchange rate scenario. The impact of fiscal and mon-
etary shocks in MULTIMOD are described in detail elsewhere; see Masson et al. (1988)
and Masson, Symansky, and Meredith (1990). In addition, a fiscal scenario is dis-
cussed in section 7.4.
9. In most models, a constant depreciation of the currency is produced by assuming
an exogenous path of the exchange rate and calculating the "add factor" in an exchange
rate (or capital account) equation that is consistent with the pre-specified path of the
exchange rate. To produce a constant percentage change in the exchange rate in a
backward-looking model, the "add factor" risk premium declines over time, while in a
forward-looking model, the risk premium increases over time.
A similar analysis was carried out using twelve econometric macro models as part
of the Brookings Conference on Empirical Macroeconomics for Interdependent Econ-
omies. Detailed tables illustrating the effects of a dollar depreciation for these twelve
models can be found in the conference proceedings, collected in a volume edited by
Bryant etal. (1988).
10. See Branson and Marchese (1988) for a discussion of the effects of an exoge-
nous change in the exchange rate in both a small theoretical model and in simulations
using MULTIMOD and the OECD's INTERLINK model.
11. In a more fully specified model, the determination of such a ratio would, of
course, be endogenous. See Dooley and Isard (1987) for discussion of a framework in
which such a ratio would be endogenously determined.
12. One change in the structure of MULTIMOD was made for this simulation.
MULTIMOD includes a rule that alters taxes to hit a steady-state level of the ratio of
government bonds to GNP. This tax reaction function was turned off.
13. If the fiscal expansion was a once and for all change instead of the gradual path
used in this simulation, the short-term interest rate would have increased.
14. In the model it is assumed that all external debt is denominated in dollars. The
term-structure of debt incurred is assumed to remain constant. In particular, it is as-
sumed that 50 percent is short term, and the other 50 percent long term, which is rolled
over every three years.
15. Home, Kremers, and Masson (1989) attempt to identify empirically relevant
channels for external adjustment.
16. The recent change in U.S. tax laws that substantially alters the tax burden on
inheritance due non-U.S. residents from assets owned in the United States is an ex-
ample of a scheme to reduce the return on U.S. assets owned by foreigners.
17. In MULTIMOD, the interest-parity condition is written as a set of bilateral equa-
tions with respect to the dollar. Since the model does not account for bilateral foreign
asset positions, the arbitrage condition was redefined in multilateral terms in order to
use the aggregate foreign asset position in the calculation of T\ .
18. Branson and Marchese (1988) do not allow for J-curve effects. Krugman
(1989b) considers the effects of a once and for all exogenous change in the risk pre-
mium against the dollar in a model incorporating J-curve effects on the trade balance.258 Bankim Chadha and Steven Symansky
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